A new cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum key technique, is introduced that leads to unconditionally secure key distribution and encryption schemes that can be readily implemented experimentally in a realistic environment. If quantum memory is available, the technique would have many features of public-key cryptography; an identification protocol that does not require a shared secret key is provided as an illustration. The possibility is also indicated for obtaining unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocols with this technique.
which takes away some of the novelty of the quantum techniques, which at first sight seem to be public-key type protocols that do not require the prior sharing of secret information.
Consider two users, Adam and Babe, with a powerful adversary Eve who can manipulate all the communications between them. In an intruder-in-the-middle or impersonation attack, Eve can pretend to be Adam to Babe, and Babe to Adam, in all the known quantum protocols. If Adam and Babe do not have a prior shared secret key for message authentication, it is often assumed that a non-jammable classical public channel would prevent impersonation.
This, however, is not the case [7] as there is still a user authentication (identification) problem -without some shared prior framework there is nothing that distinguishes Babe from an impersonator. Specifically, other than "eavesdropping" Eve may pretend to be Babe and trick Adam to tell her something that he would only tell Babe. The use of a shared secret key for authentication reduces the quantum cryptosystem to a key expansion scheme as noted in Ref. [5] , without many advantages of a public-key system. In particular, a separate key is needed for each pair of users which causes major problems in a network environment.
In standard cryptography there are a variety of approaches [2] to dispense with the use of shared secret keys, notably the use of digital signature for identification that is capable of preventing the identifier or verifier to pretend to be the identifiee.
In this paper a new cryptographic tool, anonymous key encryption (AKE), is introduced in the quantum context that has no known parallel in standard cryptography. In AKE, the encrypter does not know the value of his encrypted message. If quantum states can be stored, i.e., if quantum memory is available which is a subject of active current effort, the AKE technique can be extended to a general anonymous key technique that leads to various forms of digital signature and to a public-key type identification protocol, to be called anonymous key identification (AKI), which does not require any shared secret key.
For key distribution, an unconditional security proof on the use of AKE would be described for qubits, and it would be indicated how a similarly secure protocol may be obtained in the presence of noise and loss by using classical error correcting codes. The possible use of large-energy coherent states would also be indicated.
Let |ψ A ∈ H, where H is an arbitrary quantum state space, be a state known only to Adam and transmitted by him to Babe. Depending on the message j ∈ {1, · · · , m} ≡ M Consider the following concrete AKE system for a single qubit m = 2, n = 1, so that an arbitrary pure state ρ A = |ψ A ψ A | is represented in terms of a real vectorr ∈ R 3 via the Pauli matricesσ, in component form
If ρ A is one of M possible uniformly distributed states on the (σ 1 , σ 3 ) great circle of the Bloch sphere (or Poincare sphere in the context of photon polarization), we have
If j = 1, Babe rotates ρ A by an angle . These two states are orthogonal in a basis known only to Adam, which he can measure to determine j. Equivalently, the rotation angles may be {0, π} or some other pairs. In order that U(φ j )|ψ A is one of the M possible states ρ A ( ) of (1) − (2), M is taken to be a multiple of 4. If Adam picks ρ A ( ) randomly, the resulting density operator
A is the same for either j. Thus, even if Eve has an identical copy [8] of the state sent back to A, she can gain no information on j. This generalizes to a sequence of independent ρ i A ( ) with independent i, for which Eve's optimal joint attack on ρ B just factorizes into a product of individual attacks.
The security analysis is carried out via the theory of optimal M-ary quantum detector [9, 10] in which 1 out of M possibilities, each described by a state ρ j and a priori probability p j , is selected to optimize a given performance criterion. The selection is based on the result of a general quantum measurement described by a positive operator-valued measure (POM), which is specified to yield the optimal performance. If Eve attempts to identify ρ A ( ) by intercepting the transmission to Babe, the best she can do is given by the optimum M-ary quantum detector for discriminating the states (1) − (2), which has been worked out before.
Lemma 3 of Ref. [10] gives the optimum quantum measurement in the form of a POM, with corresponding probability of correct identification given by P c = 2/M. However, even if Eve makes an error, her estimated state is still useful for eavesdropping purpose and a different criterion needs to be used. Generally, it is the probability P a that Eve's estimated state is accepted to be correct by Adam as a result of his measurement.
where p( | ) = trΠ( )ρ A ( ) is the probability that given ρ A ( ) was transmitted, Eve takes it to be ρ E A ( ) from measuring the POM Π( ). Such a criterion falls under the general optimum quantum detector formulation, and the optimum Π( ) for (3) turns out [11] to be the same as that of determining ρ A ( ) according to the error probability criterion, which is intuitively reasonable. The resulting P a is given by 3/4 independently of M (but recall that M is a multiple of 4). Thus, if Eve measures Π( ) to determine ρ A ( ), perhaps because she cannot store the actual ρ A ( ), and transmits ρ E A ( ) to Babe, determines j by measurement on
from Babe, and sends the resulting state back to Adam, the probability that Adam decrypts correctly is 3/4. Pure guessing without measurement yields P a = 1/2.
This P a = 3/4 would be reduced to 2/3 if the whole Bloch sphere is utilized, with ρ A given by (1) with r 1 = sin θ cos φ, r 2 = cos θ, r 3 = sin θ sin φ, and e.g.,
with φ unchanged. In the case (2), M = 4 is enough to yield P a = 3/4, and in this case a total of M = 6 states [12] on the poles of any rectangular coordinate system intercepting the Bloch surface would yield P a = 2/3. In both cases Eve can get these values of P a without knowing M by measuring an orthogonal basis chosen randomly from the M possible states. Evidently P a can be further reduced if a higher dimensional H is used.
If Eve could intercept and store ρ A ( ), she could eavesdrop perfectly by sending her own ρ E ( ) to Babe in an impersonation attack. Such manipulation can be detected with test qubits mixed into the information qubits. However, a different approach is employed here in which Babe sends her modulated qubits back to Adam in a random order. This has the advantage that all possible eavesdroppings can be thwarted without checking for disturbance, thus allowing a simple proof of protocol security for key establishment. In this scheme, Adam and Babe use AKE with 8k qubits to establish a key of length 4k while expending a shared secret key of length 2k, resulting in a net key expansion of 2k as follows. For each 8 qubit block, Babe sends back the qubits in one of the following four orders equiprobably using 2 secret bits: 12345678, 87654321, 38462715, 41236587. These four sequences are chosen so that there is no qubit overlap in any position among the eight. Eve can alter the qubits from A to B in an impersonation attack, or to conduct opaque eavesdropping, or to conduct translucent eavesdropping by tapping into the communications between A and B to learn about j. The probability that Eve guesses q of the k qubit groups in the right order in an impersonation attack is given by the binomial distribution with success probability 1/4, and thus is exponentially small in q. The rest she induces an error probability P e = 1/2 per qubit for Adam, and the key establishment would fail in a trial encryption.
Eve may employ an opaque eavesdropping strategy by intercepting and re-transmitting the states from A to B and B to A. Instead of using disturbance detection, we merely use classical privacy amplification (CPA) [13] to eliminate Eve's partial information. Eve's success probability P c per qubit is bounded as follows. We grant her one copy of ρ A ( ) and one copy of the corresponding correct U(φ j )ρ A ( )U † (φ j ), i.e., we allow Eve to intercept both copies exactly as if there is no disturbance and the order is correct. From these two copies she can try to learn j by optimally processing both states. This is a binary detection problem with two states
for which the optimum probability of discrimination can be obtained by diagonalizing ρ 0 − ρ 1 [9] . The resulting optimum probability P c she would determine j correctly turns out to be the same as that obtained by measuring the optimum state detector on the copy ρ A ( ) from A to B and then measuring whether the state ρ B ( ) from B to A is clockwise or counterclockwise with respect to ρ A ( ), which is intuitively reasonable, and is given by P c = P a . If Eve launches a joint attack by making measurements on blocks of qubits, she cannot obtain a better accuracy than that of measuring one by one -the optimum quantum detector for the bit error sum factorizes when both the states and the data probabilities of the blocks factorize into a product from the corresponding bits.
In translucent eavesdropping, Eve would try to determine the data j by correlating her tappings from A to B and B to A. She can do this in the correct order only with probability 1/4. Thus, to (loosely) bound all the possible information Eve can obtain, we let her succeed in learning the bits exactly with probability 1/4, and with probability 3/4 we let her learn the bits with probability P c = P a as in (4) above. For P a = 3/4, this yields a total of 2k deterministic bits and < k Shannon bits, which can be eliminated by expending 4k bits or just 3k bits asymptotically [5, 13] . This completes the security proof in the ideal limit.
Note that no quantum memory is required in this scheme. We have used very loose bounds to avoid complex arguments and bounding techniques, but the resulting efficiency is still appreciable. The present AKE has no apparent classical analog because listening to both the transmissions from A to B and B to A would reveal too much about the bits in a classical system even when the bit order is random. The intrinsic statistical feature of quantum ontology, that it is impossible to determine the state of a single quantum system exactly, is directly expoited in AKE. The basic ingredients of our security guarantee are:
use of qubit order randomization to thwart manipulation and correlation, use of optimum quantum detector and copies to Eve to bound her partial information which is eliminated by classical privacy amplification, and use of classical error correcting code to overcome loss and noise to be presently discussed. In particular, the explicit use of a shared secret key for key expansion, in this case in obtaining secret qubit orders, is a new technique that I expect to be widely applicable in many scenarios.
The major problem for quantum security proof lies in the presence of loss and noise in realistic systems. It should be clear that the above security proof does not depend on detecting small disturbance by Eve, and can thus be expected to work in a similar way in the presence of small noise and loss with some simple error correction capability. In particular, one may employ classical error correcting codes (CECC) on qubits in lieu of quantum codes.
Thus, each codeword in a CECC (x i ), x i ∈ {0, 1}, becomes a codeword of quantum states (|x i ), where |x i is the state corresponding to 0 and 1 in the quantum modulation scheme adopted. No reconciliation [5] is needed with the use of CECC.
The protocol for AKE key distribution is in general:
(i) Adam sends enough randomly chosen |ψ A 's to Babe to cover the loss and noise in transmission to Babe as well as the CECC Babe needs to use for transmission back to
Adam.
(ii) Babe modulates the information qubits in a known CECC, sends the resulting qubits to Adam in a random order according to a short shared secret key.
(iii) Some form of CPA is employed by Adam to eliminate any possible leakage of information which is strictly bounded.
(iv) The resulting key is checked for correctness by a trial encryption.
There are many variations of this protocol including the use of test qubits or quantum memory in lieu of shared secret key. There are also many ways to use AKE for direct encryption. These topics and the security proof of the above protocol will be developed elsewhere.
If quantum states can be stored, some features of public-key cryptography can be obtained as follows. In classical public-key cryptography, a one-way function f: X → Y is roughly a map for which one can obtain y = fx ∈ Y from x ∈ X readily but it is "infeasible" to obtain
x from fx. A one-way trapdoor function results if x can be readily obtained from fx with additional "trapdoor information" relating to f [14] . For a physically given |ψ A , the function M → H with j mapped into U B j |ψ A can be regarded as a quantum one-way function with trapdoor information given by the knowledge of the actual state |ψ A , to be denoted Kψ A .
Thus, |ψ A functions like a quantum public key while Kψ A is the private key. Similar to the usual one-way trapdoor function, one can obtain the physical state U B j |ψ A with a given public key |ψ A , but cannot obtain from U B j |ψ A the value j without the knowledge Kψ A . This is the general formulation of the anonymous quantum key technique. It is clear that AKE can be described in this way, with Adam sending Babe his public key |ψ A and Babe using |ψ A to encrypt a message j which only Adam can decrypt with Kψ A . With |ψ A representing a sequence of qubits, a number of standard public key protocols can be recasted in the quantum domain. For example, one-time digital signatures and blind signatures [2] can be implemented this way. Here, we would use the anonymous key technique to obtain a quantum identification protocol AKI of the challenge-response type in which the identifier cannot pretend to be the identifiee and which is an exact analog of a protocol [15] based on classical digital signature. In AKI Adam uses his stored |φ B , φ B unknown to him, to identify Babe in the following way. He modulates |φ B ∈ H 2 with a randomly chosen φ A and transmits |φ B + φ A to Babe, say for states of the form (1) - (2), and asks her to return the state |φ A with φ B removed which Babe is capable of doing by just adding −φ B to the angle in |φ B + φ A . Adam checks by measuring the projection to |φ A . The random φ A is necessary, or else Eve can just return the state |φ = 0 , where φ = 0 is the reference angle, without using |φ B sent by Adam. The protocol can be simply summarized:
The probability that Adam or Eve could successfully impersonate Babe is P a for one qubit, which can be brought to any desired security level P s = (P a ) m with m qubits exponentially efficiently. Apart from using quantum laws instead of number theoretic complexity assumptions, the security of this protocol is evidently the same as the conventional public-key challenge-response indentification protocol [15] . Note that the success of AKI is independent of that of AKE, with both being examples of the anonymous quantum key technique.
This technique can also be used to obtain unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment schemes, outside the framework of the impossibility proof [6] , which is not sufficiently 
for a real positive α 0 in place of (1) − (2). Any two basis states of (6) have inner product exp(−2α 2 0 ) ∼ 0 for large α 0 . When M → ∞ or when M is unknown, one obtains P a = 1/2 with heterodyne detection and P a < 2/3 for the canonical phase measurement which is the maximum likelihood phase estimator [16] . This important behavior of having P a independent of α 0 would also be obtained for a known finite M α 0 , as a lower bound to the meansquare fluctuation (δθ) 2 was obtained [17] that goes as 1/|α| 2 for coherent states |α . In the P a expression, this fluctuation would cancel out the α can also be used. In either case M ∼ 10 3 is easily achievable in the laboratory, with much higher M ≥ 10 6 possible, so that large α 0 can be used for overcoming loss and noise. This is not possible in previous quantum cryptosystems such as modified BB84 because large α 0 would lead to unambiguous determination of the states involved, which is not the case if there are many states M α 0 . The use of (6) also allows the possibility of amplification and regeneration along the transmission path using quantum amplifiers [18] , as well as routing and switching in a network. Analysis of such coherent-state systems will be given in a future publication detailing how key distribution and encryption can be carried out. It appears that they hold great promise in making secure quantum cryptography truly practical.
